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Making Sense of Knowledge: A Constructivist Viewpoint
Tom Butler, Department of Accounting, Finance and Information Systems, University
College Cork, Ireland, tbutler@afis.ucc.ie

While this definition is, on the surface, all-embracing
and without contradiction is does, however, possess
certain weaknesses that can only be illustrated by a
consideration of taken-for-granted issues of ontology. The
core issue here revolves around describing the
relationships that exist between the individual and his
social world, between the knowing social actor and social
groupings and contexts in which he or she participates. In
terms of the present essay, this task begins with a brief
consideration of the constructivist, ‘antifoundational’
philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Hans Georg
Gadamer in order to sketch out the ontological basis of
knowledge.

Abstract
Under the influence of Enlightenment epistemological
thought, the social sciences have exhibited a distinct
tendency to prefer deterministic explanations of social
phenomena.
In so doing, social scientists of the
‘foundational’ school have sought objective knowledge of
social phenomena by eliminating the subjective intrusions
of concerned actors (Hekman, 1986)1. However, as
Bruner (1990; p. 118) points out “…there are no causes
to be grasped with certainty where the act of meaning is
concerned.” It is clear that ‘foundationalist’ views of
knowledge have come to dominate the information
systems (IS) field in that they influence extant
perspectives on knowledge management and on the
posited role of IT in creating, capturing, and diffusing
knowledge in social and organisational contexts. In order
to address what many would consider to be a deficiency
in such thinking, this paper offers an ‘antifoundationalist’
perspective that considers knowledge as being
simultaneously ‘situated’ and ‘distributed’ and which
recognizes its role shaping social action within ‘contexts
of practice’. Insights drawn from this short essay are
addressed to academics and practitioners in the IS field in
order to illustrate the considerable difficulties inherent in
representing individual knowledge and of the viability of
isolating, capturing and managing knowledge in
organisational contexts.

An Ontological Perspective on Knowledge
In response to the question ‘What is knowledge and
What is it not? we argue that knowledge cannot ever
become “embedded … in documents and repositories
[and] also in organisational routines, processes,
practices and norms.” Why? Precisely because it is
impossible to isolate and represent objectively “a fluid
mix of framed experience, values, contextual information,
and expert insight.” Certainly, as Bruner (1990) points
out, a person’s knowledge resides not only in his head,
but also in the notes, underlined book passages, manuals
and guides he consults, and in the computer-based data he
has access to. It is clear, however, that these are sources
of personal information only for the actor who has
painstakingly sought out, collated, and put into context
the data contained in each personal artifact. Contextual,
temporally based data makes the transition to knowledge
only when an actor interprets it in order to inform his or
her understanding of some phenomenon or other. All this
is indicative of the ‘situated’ and ‘distributed’ nature of
knowledge: But how does it relate to the social context
and ground of knowledge?

What Knowledge is and What it is Not
The point of departure for the present treatise on the
concept of ‘knowledge’ is a definition that is in good
standing within the IS field and which is congruent with
extant perspectives across the social sciences (see Grant,
1996, for example). In their book Working Knowledge,
Davenport and Prusak (1998; p.3) posit that:

As part of the interpretive process that characterizes
all understanding, meaning is attributed to data within the
context of the actor’s constantly evolving ‘lived
experience’ and under the sway of a ‘tradition’ (Gadamer,
1975). Gadamer (1975) and Heidegger (1976) illustrate
that the ‘lived experience’ of social actors arises out of the
web of encounters and dialogues that characterize
individual existence or ‘Being-in-the-world’. The concept
of ‘lived experience’ describes the relationship between
social actors and other beings that populate the tradition
or culture in which they are embedded (in a Heideggerian

Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience,
values, contextual information, and expert insight that
provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating
new experiences and information. It originates and is
applied in the minds of knowers. In organisations, it
often becomes embedded not only in documents and
repositories but also in organisational routines,
processes, practices and norms.
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sense, the term being refers not only to other humans but
all social phenomena). In delineating the constitution of
‘lived experience’, Heidegger (1976) points out social
actors are ‘thrown’ in to a ‘life-world’ where their
existence has, from the outset, been ‘tuned’ or ‘situated’
to be a specific existence with other beings, within a
specific tradition, and with a specific history. However, in
order to cope with their ‘throwness’ social actors come
ready equipped with a ‘foreknowledge’ or, in Gadamerian
terms,
a
‘prejudice’-laden
‘effective-historical
consciousness’, that enables them to interpret, make sense
of and partake in their social world. ‘Foreknowledge’ is,
in many ways, knowledge of the ‘ready-to-hand’
(Zuhanden) that constitute an actor’s ‘life world’. Thus,
the ‘ready-to-hand’ possess a degree of familiarity that
effectively sees them dissolved into the unreflective
background of the actor’s daily existence. If, however,
something happens that results in a ‘breakdown’ in
understanding, social phenomena become the object of
‘theoretical’ reasoning and acquire the ontological status
of being ‘present-at-hand’ (i.e. a Vorhanden) until the
‘breakdown’ has been repaired. As Gadamer illustrates,
social actors must give recognition to the influence that
‘effective-historical consciousness’ exerts if they are to
work out their ‘prejudices’. The process of ‘working out’
prejudices and of repairing ‘breakdowns’ in
understanding is governed by what Gadamer called the
hermeneutic ‘circle of understanding’. Here, the ‘whole’
that constitutes a phenomenon is apprehended by the
cyclical interpretation of its constituent ‘parts’ as they
relate to each other and to the ‘whole.’ In so doing, an
actor interprets relevant data as ‘present-at-hand’ using a
form of question and answer called the dialectic (Socratic,
Hegelian and Analytic-Reductionist—see Butler, 1998).
Thus, the actors’ understanding of constituent ‘parts’ will
be consolidated, and in so doing the horizons or
perspectives of interpreter and interpreted will gradually
fuse. Thus, in repairing ‘breakdowns’ a ‘fusion of
horizons’ (of understanding) takes place between
interpreter and interpreted. The pivotal role of language
in the interpretive process of understanding is has been
noted by Gadamer (1975). Accordingly, Bruner (1990)
argues that institutional contexts are socially constructed
through the narratives of constituent actors. Thus, over
time and through highly complex and ill-defined social
processes constituted by a polyphonic dialectic evolves
the shared understanding that constitutes culture and
tradition. Finally, it is clear from Gadamer (1975) that the
authoritative impulse to conform, as indicated by the
existence of Heidegger’s das Man, is testimony to the
resilience of a shared ‘world view’ among actors in
institutional contexts. This brief ontological view of
knowledge has profound implications for those who
examine the nature of knowledge and its diffusion in
institutional contexts as will be seen in the following subsection.

IT and the Social Construction of Knowledge
If the key to understanding social action lies in
explicating the influence of shared ‘weltanschauungen’,
‘lived experience’, and ‘tradition’, as socially embedded
institutional knowledge, then the representation of such
knowledge must be the goal of all who propose to manage
it. However, the impossibility of this task is underlined by
Dreyfus (1998) who cites Husserl’s exasperation at trying
to give a detailed account of the experience of the
everyday lives of social actors. Husserl (1960) termed
social actors’ representations of their experiential
knowledge the noema. However, after devoting his life’s
work to its delineation he concluded in the face of the
noema’s “huge concreteness” that the “tremendous
complication” in its representation made it an impossible
task (Husserl, 1969; p. 244 and p. 246). Significantly,
Minsky (1981) commented on the enormity of attempting
to represent common-sense experiential knowledge using
computer-based systems. This point is underscored by
Bruner (1990; p.5) who argues that:
Information processing cannot deal with anything
beyond well-defined and arbitrary entries that can
enter into specific relationships that are strictly
governed by a program of elementary operations.
Thus, in Bruner’s Acts of Meaning the message is
clear: the experiential knowledge and skills of social
actors cannot readily, if ever, be embedded in information
systems (see Boland, 1987). However this is not
surprising as Dreyfus (1998) notes that philosophers from
Socrates to Husserl have wrestled with the problem of
knowledge representation without much success.
Nevertheless, additional arguments are adduced to
convince the skeptical.
The socially constructed nature of knowledge is
indicated by Berger and Luckmann (1967: p. 65) who
posit that:
The primary knowledge about institutional order is
knowledge on the pretheoretical level. It is the sum
total of 'what everyone knows' about a social world,
an assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets
of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths and so forth, the
theoretical integration of which requires considerable
intellectual fortitude in itself, as the long line of heroic
integrators from Homer to the latest sociological
system-builders testify.
This point is indicative of the nature of organisational
reality; it is also congruent with the perspectives of
Heidegger and Gadamer as articulated previously. Hence,
pretheoretical knowledge, as the articulated (present-athand) and unarticulated (ready-to-hand) components of
Aristotelian ‘phronesis’ (experiential ‘self-knowledge’)
and ‘techne’ (‘skills-based’ knowledge), plays a formative
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role in establishing canonical modes of behavior
(habitualised social action or organisational routines, if
you will) and in the transmission of social behaviors
among actor networks (Gadamer, 1975; Dunne, 1993). To
underscore this, Dreyfus (1998; p. 285) turns to
Heidegger to argue that “the everyday context which
forms the background of communications is not a belief
system or a set of rules or principles…but is rather a set
of social skills, a kind of know-how, any aspect of which
makes sense only on the rest of the shared social
background.” What then of the IS researchers and
practitioners who assume that it is possible to describe
and codify social contexts as objective facts and who
therefore consider unproblematic the transfer of
knowledge in organisations? Dreyfus (ibid., p. 283) again
draws on Heidegger to reject the notion that “the shared
world presupposed in communication could be
represented as an explicit and formalized set of facts.”
All this implies that social knowledge cannot be
objectified and exist outside the ‘heads’ of knowers:
furthermore, it renders fruitless any attempt to codify it
objectively. It also casts doubt on those who speak
authoritatively about knowledge transfer mechanisms and
who ignore the social contexts that gives rise to such
knowledge.

rational powers which give us two quite distinct modes of
practical knowledge.” Thus, a social actor’s ‘selfknowledge’ (phronesis) is a synthesis of his temporal
experience of social phenomena with an ability to perform
practical actions in relation to such phenomena.
According to Gadamer’s (1975) interpretation of
Aristotle’s phronesis, experiential or ‘self-knowledge’
cannot be learned or forgotten; it is ethical and moral in
character and, as such, it is the supreme influence on an
individual’s actions. It is clear that skill-based knowledge
(techne) and theoretical knowledge (as theoria, sophia, or
episteme) are informed by the ‘self-knowledge’
(phronesis) of relevant social actors. In so doing, ‘selfknowledge’ embraces, as Gadamer indicates, both the
means and ends of social action. Because of its unique
constitution, ‘self-knowledge’ does not often lend itself to
linguistic expression. The same could be said of ‘techne’,
which provides the expert or craftsman with an
understanding of the why and the wherefore, the how and
with-what of the production process. Thus, techne, in
providing a rational plan of action, also embraces both the
means and ends of production activities.

Aristotle and Individual Knowledge

This essay argues that an understanding of phronesis
and techne as the two primordial components of
individual knowledge is vital for researchers and
practitioners in the IS field. Yet studies on systems
development and the emergent area of knowledge
management pay scant attention to the ontological ground
of knowledge. Consider the assertion by Checkland and
Holwell (1998: p. 39) that “the core concern of the IS
field [is] the orderly provision of data and information
within an organisational using IT”—clearly this involves
the development of IS and their use. So what of the
posited role for IT in the management of knowledge? Can
phronesis and techne be embedded in IT? And can such
systems account for all contingencies in their application?
As Orr (1990) illustrated in his study of photocopier
repair technicians, the attempted codification of a fairly
well defined ‘techne’ proved a failure; here phronesis
proved the more influential of the two types of individual
knowledge. Why? Because of the contextual nature of the
Heideggerian ‘breakdowns’ encountered and the
experiential knowledge of the repairmen, some of which
was vicariously acquired through the Brunerian narratives
they engaged in while constructing their ‘community of
knowing’. How then can IT capture adequately the
experiential and interpretive nature of the phronesis
required for this type of problem solving? As Dreyfus
(1998) concludes, the answer to this question is it cannot.
Consider also the IT-enabled ‘techne’ of processing a
business transaction. Here, the experiential knowledge of
the operator plays a major role in dictating the questions
posed and details taken in efficiently executing a

Implications of Phronesis and Techne for the
IS Field

In Book 6 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle focuses
on practical and technical reason—phronesis and techne.
The importance and relevance of this work to any
treatment of knowledge is underscored by Dunne (1993).
Hence, an understanding of phronesis and techne is
essential to the present project as it brings into sharp focus
the situated nature of individual knowledge and, as
Gadamer (1975) illustrates, adds to the ontological
description already offered. To begin, it must be noted
that in reading the Ethics in the context of the
Metaphysics one is led to conclude that both phronesis
and techne are, ultimately, forms of practical knowledge.
However, in the Ethics Aristotle distinguishes between
praxis and poiesis. The conduct of social affairs in a
thoughtful and competent manner Aristotle refers to as
praxis. This involves the application of phronesis, that is,
a social actor’s experientially based ‘self-knowledge’.
Poiesis, on the other hand, Aristotle involves the activities
of ‘making’ or ‘production’. Here techne is the kind of
knowledge possessed by the expert craftsmen and
involves the understanding and application of the
principles governing the production of social
phenomena—both tangible and intangible. It is important
to note that Dunne (1993) in his extensive treatment of the
topic interprets phronesis as being practical knowledge
and techne as being skills-based knowledge. However, on
page 244 he states, in regard to poiesis and praxis, that
“To these two specifically different modes of activity,
techne and phronesis correspond, respectively, as two
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commonsense is called for. To recap, this paper’s main
argument is that knowledge of social phenomena defies
objectification and representation. Institutional knowledge
does not therefore exist as an objective phenomenon
outside of the heads of the knowers: but what of
information? Having illustrated why knowledge cannot be
represented, a question is raised as to the status of
information. Following a constructivist logic, Introna
(1997) points out that information is ‘hermeneutic
understanding’ and is acquired through an interpretive
process by an ‘already-knowing’ individual. Hence, if
information too is abstract and ambiguous in its depiction,
data is all that can be represented, stored, transferred and
manipulated by IT. Again it must be emphasized that the
primary mode of informing is the narrative: as such
narratives serve to define the canonical, and help
construct and maintain institutionalised patterns of
behaviour; but, narratives, written or oral, consist of data,
not knowledge or information—hence, the need for
dialogue and dialectic. Therefore, if IT is to be utilized to
give voice to organizational narratives, then it must be
recognized that it will be a conduit for data only. And
because gaps in comprehension will always exist, no
matter how sophisticated the technology and its power of
representation, IT must enable a dialectic to take place
between social actors and the phenomena they wish to
understand. These points are reflected in the capabilities
of the latest generation of Internet/Intranet-enabled
knowledge
management
applications
(see
the
ServiceWare Inc.2 product suite, for example). Although
the vendors of such products argue that they are capturing
the knowledge of customers, employees, and domain
experts, the inputs to and outputs from such applications
tend to be well-defined and constitute significant
abstractions from the phronesis and techne of social
actors (again in the form of data). Hence, considerable
interpretation is required, and while knowledge base
inference engines are limited in this respect, human
beings are well adapted to this process, even though their
interpretations of phenomena rarely concur with those of
other actors, except in situations where the data in
question is well delimited. That such systems are of
limited value in helping social actors communicate and
repair the ‘breakdowns’ they encounter is not at issue;
they do not, however, help social actors manage
knowledge in organisation.

transaction, irrespective of the routinized features and
activities embedded in the system. Why? Because
information systems are ‘closed’ in the sense that they
cannot ever capture all aspects of a business problem
domain. In different spheres of organizational activity, the
data required to resolve a ‘breakdown’ might be of a more
comprehensive nature (e.g. a report or narrative aimed at
informing task-based problem solving), while targeting a
problem solving ‘techne’. In this scenario the contextdependent experiential knowledge of both the author and
the recipient(s) will be of especial import and will depend
on the actors’ unarticulated, shared social background. If,
for example, the author and recipient belong to a
particular socially constructed ‘community of practice’
(Brown and Duguid, 1991), then each will participate in a
shared tradition with similar phronetic and technic
backgrounds. However, even with this shared
background, Boland and Tenkasi (1995) indicate that the
support available from conventional systems will be
limited to well-defined user needs. Given all that has been
said here it is doubtful that the futuristic ‘electronic
communication forums’ suggested by Boland and Tenkasi
will be anymore successful than their data processing
predecessors in supporting knowledge transfer and
management within ‘communities of knowing’, despite
shared phronetic and technic backgrounds.
Echoing Dunne (1993), practical knowledge
(phronesis and techne) is a fruit that can grow on the
fertile soil of individual experience; however, experience
of the world occurs within a web of social relationships,
and individual knowledge develops within the historical
context of a tradition under the influence of significant
others. But does all this imply for the IS field? Consider,
for example, that extant perspectives on IT competencies
chiefly operate from resource-based view of the firm,
which is positivist in its orientation and focuses on the
outcomes of the application of capabilities rather than the
process by which they come into being. Resultant theories
are not therefore sensitive to the type of ontological issues
described herein and, accordingly, fail to capture the
social and historical nature of individual knowledge in
institutional contexts. On this point, future studies on the
development and application of IT competencies should,
we believe, take an interpretive stance and focus on how
phronesis and techne are developed and applied in
institutional contexts and not just on outcomes.

In conclusion, it is unfortunate that in order to help
make sense of what is a complex, socially constructed
world, academics and practitioners have created ‘cartoon’
explanations of the realities they perceive—and the
concept of knowledge is here included, as data has been
accorded the status of knowledge. There is nothing wrong
with this, it’s how ordinary people unreflectively make
sense of their world, but it is not the foundation on which
a science should rest.

Conclusions
This paper joins calls within the IS field for a
reassessment of its position on the important topic of
knowledge. True, the fundamental ideas presented herein
are not new, but the manner of their presentation and
argument is. In any event, given the recent feeding frenzy
on the topic of knowledge and the unquestioning
acceptance of the nostrums proposed by some of those
championing the cause, a timely injection of
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